especially true when apportioning strategic intelligence resources. This study reviews and analyzes the allocation of national intelligence resources and priorities for Latin America. The current national security architecture including the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Military Strategy (NMS) define our national interests in the Western Hemisphere. To determine the adequacy of national intelligence allocation to Latin America it is necessary to review the process of translating the current national strategies into Latin American focused National Intelligence Priorities. This study analyzes three current and projected Latin American threats that potentially impact the security and national interests of the United States: failed states, ungoverned spaces, and transnational threats. Adequate and comprehensive strategic intelligence focus on Latin America is critical to the current and future US national security. The study concludes with policy recommendations to address intelligence efficiency and resource allocation with the relative importance of Latin America to the United States.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOCUS ON LATIN AMERICA: IS IT ADEQUATE?
Historically, Latin America has been an economy of force region for United States. This has been especially true when apportioning strategic intelligence resources. Some would argue that the last time the U.S. government committed to a specific Latin American strategy was during the Reagan Administration in the 1980s, "when defeating the Soviet Union and halting its advances in Central America were part of a comprehensive effort to win the Cold War" States national strategy and policy shifted to a focus on the fight against terrorism. Since we are a country at war, the recent national strategies strongly reflect our focus on the security of the American people. To ensure that an environment of security is maintained, the U.S. must continue to look beyond its borders and project the promotion of our democratic values and support to economic prosperity to all regions, to include Latin America. Many democracies in Latin America are relatively young and vulnerable to a variety of challenges, including influence from many internal and external sources. The strength of the democracies throughout Latin America is endangered by limited economic growth and weak governmental institutions. If our national intelligence resources ignore or neglect the Latin American region it reduces our ability to monitor potential threats to the fragile democracies, monitor support to extremist groups, and increased insurgent activity in this vital region. But what constitutes "adequate" intelligence coverage of our national interests in Latin America? "Adequate" is defined as enough
intelligence support for what is required and that it is sufficient and suitable for our Nation's needs.
In order to determine what the intelligence requirements are, this paper discusses the types of intelligence available, the structure of national intelligence and US national strategies for the Western Hemisphere. Based on information derived from the national strategies and interviews with intelligence professionals from several national agencies, a list of threats present in Latin America is developed. The paper will conclude with an assessment of the adequacy of Latin America intelligence coverage and policy recommendations to balance intelligence allocation with Latin American threats. The four recommendations provided at the end of this paper support improved resource and training efficiencies, balanced intelligence resource allocation, and strengthened security cooperation relationships throughout the region. The recommendations are derived from the research conducted and referenced in this paper, Signals Intelligence is technical and intelligence information derived from the exploitation of foreign electronic emissions which is comprised either individually or in combination of communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT). Within the intelligence community, the National Security Agency is overall responsible for SIGINT. Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) is publicly available information appearing in print or electronic form including radio, television, newspapers, journals, the Internet, commercial databases, and videos, graphics, and drawings. Open-source collection responsibilities are broadly distributed through the IC, but the major collectors are the DNI's Open Source Center The blending and synthesis of these single source intelligence disciplines are used to develop all-source intelligence. All-source intelligence incorporates intelligence products, organizations, and activities from all sources of information and intelligence, including opensource information, in the production of intelligence. All-source intelligence, while not a separate intelligence discipline, is the critical product developed by analysts from multiple intelligence or information sources. It is possible for an adversary to deceive intelligence collectors reliant upon one source, such as imagery intelligence or human intelligence. Therefore, the value of all-source intelligence is the reduction of one single source reliance and vulnerability to deceptive practices. When you combine several intelligence sources, the all-source analysis either verifies or refutes single source data.
National Intelligence Structure
The seven intelligence disciplines are managed, collected and produced by the National Intelligence Community (IC). As a result of the attacks on 11 September 2001 and the subsequent 9/11 Commission, the IC is undergoing a wide reaching transformation. In April 2005, the Office of the Director, National Intelligence (DNI) was established to coordinate the The NSS states that "democracies are the most responsible members of the international system, promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering terrorism and terror-supporting extremism; and extending peace and prosperity" 10 . Our National Security Strategy is based on the belief that the Western Hemisphere is the "frontline of defense of American national security". American security is directly linked to the security and stability of our nearest "neighbors". The National Security Strategy for the Western Hemisphere seeks to 11 : solidify strategic relationships with regional leaders in Central and South America and the Caribbean who are deepening their commitment to democratic values…to work with regional partners to make multilateral institutions like the OAS and the Inter-American Development Bank more effective and better able to foster concerted action to address threats that may arise to the region's stability, security, prosperity, or democratic progress…these partnerships can advance our four strategic priorities for the region: bolstering security, strengthening democratic institutions, promoting prosperity, and investing in people. -Venezuela as a demagogue awash in oil money is undermining democracy and seeking to destabilize the region. capability contained in the NDS that impacts Latin America is the need to strengthen intelligence to reduce vulnerabilities. The three priorities to strengthen intelligence listed in the NDS should directly impact our Latin America intelligence policy. The first priority is the necessity for early warning of "imminent crises" such as instability in Latin American countries. The second priority is to deliver exacting intelligence. The need to "improve support to intelligence consumers…to increase our capabilities for collection" 16 is essential. Third, horizontal integration within the intelligence community and the ability to "fuse operations and intelligence…will enable us to better acquire, assess, and deliver critical intelligence both to senior decision-makers and war fighters"
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.
Another identified NDS operational capability focus that should impact the Latin American intelligence priorities is the effort to deny sanctuary to enemies.
Adversaries who threaten the United States and its interests require secure bases. They will use great distance or sanctuary created by ungoverned territory to their advantage…to deny sanctuary requires a number of capabilities, including: persistent surveillance…and stability operations to assist in the establishment of effective and responsible control over ungoverned territory 18 .
Irregular challenges provide a uniquely difficult problem set for intelligence support to Latin America. To be successful, the intelligence community must possess "the capabilities to identify, locate, track, and engage individual enemies and their networks. Doing so will require greater capabilities across a range of areas, particularly intelligence, surveillance and communications" States are transnational threats, failed, failing or unstable regimes and ungoverned space. All three of these threats can potentially provide support to global terrorism, violent extremist movements, narcotics trafficking, and increased, potentially violent, resource competition.
These threats are of great concern to United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), the combatant command that represents our forward defense in the Western Hemisphere. The SOUTHCOM mission is "to protect the southern approaches to the United States and to enhance hemispheric stability and security" 27 against challenges such as illicit trafficking and narco-terrorism. Latin American democracies have shown growing differences with the longestrunning democracies of North America and Europe. The political institutions, the rule of law and the level of accountability fail to work effectively and meet citizens' expectations… new forms of political crises are likely to appear in the years ahead to include weakness of political parties, the emergence of charismatic leaders, and the mounting influence of societies' "de facto powers" (los poderes fácticos, including elites, media, business groups, military, criminal organizations, etc.) in electoral contests.
Ungoverned space is "Territory lacking effective, organized, and/or responsible governance, affording secure sanctuary for illicit criminal organizations, terrorist network(s), and/or anti-government paramilitaries…Includes under-governed areas within a country with a functioning government. Government may be witting or unwitting"
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. Ungoverned space presents a regional security threat concern because it is a key resource used by terrorists as a safe haven. According to the U.S House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), the "failure of government to police its own territory can often provide nurturing environments for terrorist groups, and for insurgents and criminals. The failure of governments to control their own territory creates potential power vacuums that open opportunities for those who hate" 33 In the case of Latin America, there are two regions considered ungoverned or under-governed:
The Tri-Border area where Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina intersect and FARC controlled regions in Colombia. The SOUTHCOM Commander calls attention to the unconventional, "insidious nature of the threats to the U.S. and our partner nations can be somewhat deceiving at first glance…and the lack of security, stability…under-governed sovereign territory and porous borders" 34 all of which lead to increased opportunities for extremist groups to operate and proliferate in specific Latin American regions.
The NIC also addressed the future threat of ungoverned areas to regional security. The exploitation of ungoverned areas by narco-traffickers, criminal organizations and transnational terrorists groups could:
begin to provide the mechanisms to militarily confront the armed conflicts within national borders...the effects of which are already appearing and could increase in the coming years, the nexus between domestic governance and international insecurity of the region will escalate. Areas without states' full control (the departments of Boyacá, Caquetá and several others in Colombia; the Venezuelan-Brazilian and Venezuelan-Colombian borders; areas of Cochabamba in Bolivia; the coasts of Haiti, etc.) will be prime areas for this type of alliance 35 .
A fourth potential threat to regional stability not specifically addressed in the national strategies but of key concern to the Commander, SOUTHCOM is the leftist, neopopulist 
Army G-2 (DAMI)
At the Army G-2 level, Latin American issues are rarely briefed or requested. A senior G-2 intelligence professional with supervisory oversight over DAMI resources admitted that he "didn't know much about that region". Several senior Latin American intelligence analysts lamented that the G-2 has provided no guidance on Latin American regional intelligence priorities or focus. Yet, throughout the DAMI organization, intelligence analysts agreed that the top three intelligence priorities for Latin America are: Venezuela, Colombia, and Cuba.
Venezuela's ties with rogue regimes, to include Iran, are an increasing concern. The focus in Colombia is force protection for the US troops. The threat of a mass Cuban refugee migration after Fidel Castro's death is an ongoing concern but one that DAMI analysts feel they have sufficiently covered.
The economy of scale effort given to DAMI Latin American resource allocation or analytical coverage results in a lack of flexibility to respond in time of regional crisis. The only DAMI human intelligence assets located in Latin America are 22 HUMINT/Force protection personnel supporting the counter-drug mission. Joe Parker, Director, Army HUMINT Operations Center, concedes that the Latin America intelligence support will "lose more assets"
in the future and that they will be even more reliant upon cooperative efforts of the countries in the region 44 . There will be no increased intelligence focus on Latin America unless there is a direct link to a national priority like narco-trafficking or a particular issue that becomes important to US citizens. Resources previously allocated to counter-narcotics now work Iraq or Afghanistan issues. Mr. Parker believes there is an increased level of risk as the number of intelligence assets decreases. This loss in surge capability may impact the US ability to refocus collection resources after Fidel Castro's death. James Bonnes, Deputy Director of the Counter-Intelligence (CI)/Human Intelligence (HUMINT)/Security Directorate, Army G-2 felt that collection capability in Latin America was "red-lined" and that the organization was taking a considerable risk in flexibility to respond to regional crises. 45 Several senior DAMI Latin American analysts believe we are accepting the most risk in the ungoverned areas where the level of corruption is high and drug traffickers operate unimpeded. The Tri-border region houses a Lebanese community that is known to provide fundraising and counterfeit documents, to include visas, to Shia elements in the region. The link between these Shia elements and Iranian operatives is a growing concern, but currently it is assessed that these communities are sympathizers but not organizers. The analysts voiced their frustration that there is no consistent intelligence coverage of this potential threat. The focus on the Islamic groups in Latin America requires precious resources but the analysts felt the need to look more at the money trail for possible Al-Queda links. Currently, the Intelligence community is reliant upon Paraguay and Brazil to provide information on Tri-border activities.
The two countries where G-2 analysts felt we are accepting the most risk are Peru and Bolivia.
These are source countries for coca. The counter-narcotics analysts believe that there is an increased opportunity for coca growth resurgence since our resources and national priorities are focused elsewhere and our government is no longer pressuring those country elites to aggressively fight the narco-traffickers. The counter-narcotics analysts believe they need more operational assets and strategic focus to sufficiently cover the regional challenges highlighted in NSS 2006. The G-2 analysts understand the national intelligence requirements system very well and continue to work within the system for support on Latin American issues.
National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC)
The NGIC Latin American section is composed of five analysts focused on regional areas: Anderson's overall assessment is that the lack of intelligence resources means that "If something happens, we will be holding an empty bag and facing another intelligence failure" There is a real need for all-source intelligence analysts who possess foreign language skills. Therefore, the second recommendation is to require target country language training for selected all-source intelligence analysts in the IC. An all-source analyst with target country language skills can directly access original documents not previously translated or interpreted.
An analyst's direct access to target language professional journals, newspapers, academic and political publications and military communications allows first level analysis free from previous editing or organizational bias (State INR vs. DIA vs. NGIC). The necessary language skills must be defined in the analyst's job descriptions. In order to be effective, the level of language proficiency must be a minimum of 2/2 on the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) or agency equivalent. The all-source analyst's language proficiency should focus on reading skills rather than speaking skills and must be coupled with target country cultural and environmental training. To gain maximum benefit, the IC must program assignment stability for all-source analysts to increase their target country knowledge base and experience. Due to the current lack of personnel with target language skills, the IC should employ more foreign born all-source intelligence analysts to conduct unclassified or collateral analysis. The current security requirements for these personnel need to be reevaluated and balanced with the unique skills In addition, when we train foreign intelligence analysts we also gain the benefit of their analytical insights and products. The low cost, long term investment in theater security cooperation would require U.S. policymakers to look beyond the immediate national security focus in the Middle East and realize these long term benefits in Latin America.
Conclusion
The research conducted for this project indicates that a minimum, but adequate, amount of intelligence is provided to national decision and policy makers to support current Latin American national security requirements. There is enough intelligence focus on Latin America for what is currently required and is sufficient and suitable for our Nation's needs. Given the projected political and military focus in the Middle East, it is not likely that Latin America will receive a higher priority for intelligence resources unless a crisis occurs. If a crisis occurs, most of the IC regional analysts interviewed for this report agree that they will be unable to surge reliable HUMINT assets and will rely extensively on open source information, limited technical resources and local government sources. An additional risk with minimal, but adequate, intelligence coverage is our inability to monitor threats to fragile democracies, support to extremist groups, and increased insurgent activity in this vital region. Potentially, this well known lack of national intelligence focus could embolden anti-American leaders and nondemocratic movements to reduce democratic strides made throughout the region. 
